Experimental Eavesdropping Attack against Ekert's Protocol based on
  Wigner's Inequality by Bovino, F. A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
08
03
0v
2 
 6
 A
ug
 2
00
3
Experimental Eavesdropping Attack against Ekert’s Protocol based on Wigner’s
Inequality
F. A. Bovino,∗ A. M. Colla, and G. Castagnoli
Elsag spa
Via Puccini 2-16154 Genova (Italy)
S. Castelletto, I. P. Degiovanni,† and M. L. Rastello
Istituto Elettrotecnico Nazionale G. Ferraris
Strada delle Cacce 91-10135 Torino (Italy)
(Dated: July 19, 2018)
We experimentally implemented an eavesdropping attack against the Ekert protocol for quantum
key distribution based on the Wigner inequality. We demonstrate a serious lack of security of this
protocol when the eavesdropper gains total control of the source. In addition we tested a modified
Wigner inequality which should guarantee a secure quantum key distribution.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a method
for distributing a secret key for unconditional secret com-
munications based on the ”one time pad” because it guar-
antees that the presence of any eavesdropper compromis-
ing the security of the key is revealed. For a review on
this topic see [1].
The first protocol for QKD has been proposed in 1984
by Bennett and Brassard [2], the worldwide famous BB84
protocol. In 1991 A. Ekert proposed a new QKD protocol
whose security relies on the non-local behavior of quan-
tum mechanics, i.e., on Bell’s inequalities [3].
Several groups around the world implemented and
tested QKD systems based on variants of the BB84 pro-
tocol using either faint laser [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] or entangled
photons [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], while, to our knowledge,
only recently two groups implemented the Ekert’s proto-
col [12, 13]. In particular Naik et al. [13] implemented a
variant of the Ekert’s protocol based on Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality as proposed in Ekert’s
paper [3], and Jennewein et al. [12] implemented the
Ekert’s protocol based on the Wigner inequality.
In ref. [12] the Wigner inequality was first proposed to
provide an easier and equally reliable eavesdropping test
as the CHSH when the Ekert protocol is implemented.
The necessary security proof of the Ekert protocol based
on the Wigner inequality consists in verifying the viola-
tion of W ≥ 0.
To obtain the Wigner inequality (W ≥ 0) it is nec-
essary to review the Wigner argument [15]. Two main
assumptions are stipulated in the proofs of the Wigner
inequality: locality and realism. Locality means that Al-
ice’s measurements do not influence Bob’s measurements,
and vice versa. Realism means that, given any physical
property, its value exists independently of its observation
or measurement. The counterpart of the local-realistic
theories is the non-locality behavior of quantum mechan-
ics, a signature of quantum entanglement. In particular
Wigner considered a quantum system prepared in the
singlet state, and he obtained the violation of the in-
equality W ≥ 0, i.e. , W = −0.125. Furthermore, in the
derivation of his inequality, Wigner assumed perfect anti-
correlation in the measurement results. This assumption
is obviously reasonable in the test of realism and locality
of a physical theory (it reflects the classical counterpart
of a quantum system prepared in the singlet state). Nev-
ertheless, in terms of QKD this assumption corresponds
to a lack of security.
In fact, when the eavesdropper, Eve, measures photons
on either one or both of Alice and Bob channels, her
presence should be revealed by a higher value of W than
the local-realistic theories limit W = 0, as it happens
for the CHSH inequality [3]. Unfortunately this is not
the case. In fact, only when Eve adopts an intercept-
resend strategy and detects one photon of the pair, the
inequality becomes W ≥ 0.0625, but, as we will show,
this is not for eavesdropping on both channels, because
in this case there is no limit [16].
In this letter we perform an experiment proving the
weakness of the Wigner inequality as a security test for
QKD, under the condition of Eve gaining total control
of the source of photon pairs. Under this condition, she
prepares each particle of the pair separately in a well de-
fined polarization direction, in other words she prepares
the photon in Alice’s channel in the state |φA〉, and the
photon in Bob’s channel in the state |φB〉, respectively
|φA〉 = cosφA |HA〉+ sinφA |VA〉 ,
|φB〉 = cosφB |HB〉+ sinφB |VB〉 .
Thus Eve has a perfect knowledge of the polarization of
the photons sent and, even if the non-local behavior of the
original quantum system (the singlet state) is completely
removed, we prove that she can avoid disclosing herself.
We remind the reader that ref. [16] presented a mod-
ified version of the Wigner’s parameter W˜ which main-
tains the same limits, i.e. , W˜ ≥ 0 for local realistic the-
ories and W˜ = −0.125 for the singlet state, but allows
secure QKD, because W˜ contains the additional term
accounting for the anticorrelation. In our experiment we
2FIG. 1: Contour-plot of W (a) and W˜ (b) versus φA and
φB. Inset shows the regions where W < −0.125 (black),
−0.125 < W < 0 (dark grey), 0 < W (W˜ ) < 0.0625 (light
grey), W (W˜ ) > 0.0625 (white).
also measure W˜ and we observe that the minimum of
W˜ is well above the limit for local-realistic theories in
agreement with the theory [16], ensuring a secure QKD.
The measured quantities in our experiment areW and
W˜ [16], respectively
W = p−30◦
A
,0◦
B
(+A,+B) + p0◦
A
,30◦
B
(+A,+B) (1)
−p−30◦
A
,30◦
B
(+A,+B).
W˜ = p−30◦
A
,0◦
B
(+A,+B) + p0◦
A
,30◦
B
(+A,+B) + (2)
p0◦
A
,0◦
B
(−A,−B)− p−30◦
A
,30◦
B
(+A,+B).
where pαA,αB (xA, yB) are the probabilities of detecting
the pair of photons by the couple of detectors xA, yB
(xA = +A,−A and yB = +B,−B) when in the detec-
tion apparatuses two half-wave plates (HWPs) project
photons in the polarization bases
|sαz〉 = cosαz |Hz〉+ sinαz |Vz〉 ,∣∣s⊥αz
〉
= sinαz |Hz〉 − cosαz |Vz〉 ,
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FIG. 2: QKD set-up with the source of photon pairs under
Eve’s control: photon pairs are generated by SPDC in a type I
nonlinear crystal (NLC2) pumped by the pulsed laser system
(LD, Ti:Sa and NLC1). The polarization state of the photons
is controlled by half-wave plates (HWPs) and selected photons
are directed to the Alice and Bob detection apparatuses com-
posed of HWPs, interference filters (IF) fiber couplers, fibers
integrated polarizing beam splitters (PBS), single-photon de-
tectors. M mirror, DM dichroic mirror, L lens
with z = A,B. In formula
pαA,αB (+A,+B) = |〈φA|sαA〉 〈φB |sαB〉|
2
pαA,αB (+A,−B) =
∣∣〈φA|sαA〉 〈φB|s⊥αB
〉∣∣2
pαA,αB (−A,+B) =
∣∣〈φA|s⊥αA
〉
〈φB |sαB〉
∣∣2
pαA,αB (−A,−B) =
∣∣〈φA|s⊥αA
〉 〈
φB |s
⊥
αB
〉∣∣2 . (3)
In Fig. 1 (a) and (b) we present the calculated contour
plots of W and W˜ versus the polarization directions φA
and φB of the photons of the pair sent by Eve. Highest
values of W and W˜ (max(W ) ≃ max(W˜ ) ≃ 0.9557) cor-
responds to the center of white regions of Fig.s 1. Darker
regions correspond to lower range of values for W and
W˜ .
The values min(W ) ≃ −0.2121 are in the middle of
black regions of Fig. 1 (a) along ”Fig. 3 (a)” line,
while min(W˜ ) ≃ 0.0443 are almost in the middle of
dark grey regions of Fig. 1 (b). The straight lines for
φB = 0
◦, 62◦, 98◦ represent sections of the plots where
the theoretical predictions are compared with the exper-
imental results of Figs. 3 (a), (b) and (c).
In Fig. 2 we depict the experimental scheme consid-
ering the situation in which Eve has total control of the
source. In this scheme, the source under Eve’s control
replaces the source of entangled photon pairs of a typical
QKD scheme [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Eve’s source is ob-
tained by a 1 mm length LiIO3 nonlinear crystal (NLC2)
pumped by ultrashort pulses (150 fs) at 415 nm gen-
erated from a second harmonic (obtained from NLC1)
3of a ultrashort mode-locked Ti-Sapphire with a repeti-
tion rate of 76 MHz pumped by a 532 nm green laser.
The NLC2 realizes a non-collinear type I phase matching
and Eve selects two quantum correlated optical chan-
nels along which the twin photons at 830 nm (emitted at
3.4◦) are sent towards Alice and Bob’s detection appa-
ratuses [17, 18]. The down-converted photons of a pair
have the same polarization state (ordinary waves) and
Eve can modify deterministically the polarization state
of the photon by means of a half-wave-plate (HWP) in
each channel, in other words Eve sends photon pairs to
Alice and Bob with polarization state |φA〉 and |φB〉, re-
spectively.
Alice and Bob’s detection apparatuses are identical
and are composed of an open air-fiber coupler to collect
the down-converted light by single-mode optical fibers.
The detection of photons in the proper polarization ba-
sis is guaranteed by a HWP before the fiber coupler and
a fiber-integrated polarizing beam splitter (PBS). Pho-
tons at the two output ports of the PBS are sent to fiber
coupled photon counters (Perkin-Elmer SPCM-AQR-14)
[19]. Interference filters peaked at 830 nm with 11 nm
bandwidth are placed in front of the fiber couplers to
reduce straylight.
Coincident counts between any of Alice’s detectors
(+A, −A) and any of Bob’s detectors (+B, −B) are ob-
tained from an Elsag prototype of four-channel coinci-
dent circuit [20, 21]. Single-counts and coincidences are
counted by a National Instruments [19] sixteen channels
counter plug-in PC card.
The terms pαA,αB (xA, yB) are estimated in terms of
the number of coincident counts:
pαA,αB (xA, yB) =
NαA,αB (xA, yB)
[NαA,αB (+A,+B) +NαA,αB (+A,−B)+
NαA,αB (−A,+B) +NαA,αB (−A,−B)]
(4)
where NαA,αB (xA, yB) is the number of coincidences
measured by the couple of detectors xA, yB (x, y = +,−)
when Alice and Bob’s detection apparatuses project pho-
tons in the polarization bases at Eq.s (3).
In Fig. 3 (a) we present our main result: photons sent
by Eve in a definite polarization state violate the limit of
local-realistic theories. Experimental data forW (circles)
and W˜ (squares) are presented versus φA, with φB fixed
approximately at 62◦ and show a good agreement with
theoretical predictions (lines).
As expected from the theory [16], not only doesW vio-
late the limit of local-realistic theories (W = 0), but also
some data points pass the quantum limit (W = −0.125);
while W˜ is well above the limit of local-realistic theories.
The theoretical curves are calculated with φA = 62
◦, and
the discrepancy between theory and experiment can be
explained by noting the difficulties in the proper angular
positioning of the four HWPs and in the noise introduced
by real optical devices, e.g., fibers, PBSs, detectors dark
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FIG. 3: Experimental data for W (squares) and W˜ (circles)
and theoretical curves (lines) are showed. Range of values of
Wigner’s parameter corresponding to local-realistic theories
and quantum mechanics (Q.M.) are indicated. (a) Violation
of the limit of local-realistic theories for W , obtained with
φB = 62
◦. (b) Minimum obtainable for W˜ obtained with
φB = 98
◦, along with violation of the limit of local-realistic
theories for W . (c) W˜ =W obtained with φB = 0
◦.
counts and straylight.
In Fig. 3 (b) we present the experimental data and the
theoretical curve obtained with φB = 98
◦, corresponding
to a position close to the minima of W˜ as predicted by
the theory. Fig. 3 (b) shows a good agreement between
4experimental data (circles) and theoretical predictions of
W˜ and the minimum of experimental values, 0.0685, is
slightly higher than the theoretical predictions of 0.0466.
Furthermore, Fig. 3 (b) shows also the experimental
data for W (small squares) together with the associated
theoretical curve, and we observe that also in this case a
violation of the local-realistic theories limit occurs.
According to Eq.s (1) and (2), we note that W˜ differs
fromW only because of the term p0◦
A
,0◦
B
(−A,−B), thus if
p0◦
A
,0◦
B
(−A,−B) = 0 then W˜ =W , and this occurs when
φA = 0
◦, 180◦ or φB = 0
◦, 180◦.
In Fig. 3 (c) we consider the situation when φB = 0
◦
and we observe that the experimental data for W˜ (small
circles) are almost superimposed to theW ones (squares)
in good agreement with the theoretical prediction, W˜ =
W (line).
Some further analysis of W˜ must be considered for
the practical implementation of the Ekert protocol based
on Wigner’s inequality. According to [12], we highlight
that the Ekert’s protocol based on modified Wigner’s in-
equality still guarantees a simplification with respect to
the one based on the CHSH inequality, because Alice
and Bob randomly choose between two rather than three
bases. Though the necessity of an experimental evalu-
ation of the term p0◦
A
,0◦
B
(−A,−B) forces Alice and Bob
to sacrifice part of the key for the sake of security, we
note that in any practical implementation of QKD pro-
tocols, Alice and Bob distill from the noisy sifted key a
nearly noise-free corrected key by means of error correc-
tion procedures subjected to the constraint of knowing
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Also, the QBER is
estimated at the cost of losing part of the key. Thus,
we suggest using the same sacrificed part of the key to
estimate both W˜ and QBER.
To perform a proper comparison of the performances
of Ekert protocols based on Wigner’s inequality versus
the one CHSH-based [3], it is necessary to consider sit-
uations where the same number of analyzer settings are
employed. In particular, we consider the modified pro-
tocol based on Wigner inequality proposed in [16] where
Alice and Bob measure randomly using three analyzer
settings (as in the case of CHSH). This protocol is more
efficient than the protocol based on CHSH. In particular,
for CHSH only 2/9 of the qubits exchanged are devoted
to the key generation [3], while here we can improve till
1/3 depending on the security needs. Furthermore in
this protocol none of the qubits exchanged are discarded
while in the case of CHSH 1/3 of the qubits are discarded
[16].
In conclusion, this paper highlights the insecurity of
Ekert’s protocol based on the Wigner inequality. We
performed an experiment simulating the total control of
photons in Alice and Bob channels by an eavesdropper,
proving that the QKD Ekert protocol based on Wigner’s
inequality presents a serious lack of security. In addition,
we proved that a modified version of the Wigner security
parameter guarantees secure QKD.
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